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Picking and Choosing the ‘Sovereign’ Border:
A Theory of Changing State Bordering Practices
NOEL PARKER and REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN
Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
We argue that the continued persistence of borders is an effect of
their constitutive role for the many dimensions of a social par-
ticular. States cannot choose to have a border; but they can and
do make choices amongst the materials available on the various
planes of inscription for bordering. For contemporary states the
planes have become increasingly disaggregated, in the sense that
they do not fall into place at one and the same border. Thus, states
have to pick and choose different articulations (often inconsis-
tently) on different planes. We illustrate these ideas with instances,
present-day and historical, of bordering. A corollary of there being
more need to pick and choose is that articulations of sovereignty
change. So, sovereignty is increasingly the material of ‘sovereignty
games’, where sovereignty is used as a political instrument. In sum,
our theory directs attention to state bordering on different planes
of inscription.
INTRODUCTION: THE PUZZLING PERSISTENCE OF THE BORDER
It is a familiar assumption that globalisation transforms states’ discrete exis-
tence under what we can in shorthand refer to as ‘Westphalian’ order. As the
most straightforward manifestation of the separate existence of states, bor-
ders are clearly implicated in this development. An early, radical position on
this transformation was to contend that globalisation meant that the days of
states’ discrete existence, and a fortiori their borders, were numbered. But
most serious studies of globalisation soon adopted the view that states were
not, in Michael Mann’s formulation, ‘dying’, so much as ‘diversifying’ under
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changing circumstances.1 Indeed, put in terms of borders and bordering,
what R. B. J. Walker calls ‘the politics of the line’ remains very much with
us.2
Whilst borders may have become more difficult to determine than they
have been in the past, they seem certain to survive in some form or other.
Increasing difficulty might well have its origin in the kinds of things that
globalisation and integration theory have put the spotlight on: technolog-
ical developments in transport and communication; economic, especially
financial integration across state borders; trans- and supra-national legal
regimes; transnational cultural, intellectual and human flows; and so forth.
But maybe that only means that the surprising continuance of borders has
to be formulated with those factors in mind.
Our purpose in this article is indeed to explore the continued per-
sistence of state borders. Rejecting the idea that globalisation, or regional
integration, etc., simply undermine state boundaries, we try to find a way
through the wide variety of political manifestations taken by what appear
as state borders. We aim to set up a theory of states’ ‘bordering prac-
tices’; extrapolate the implications; and then check its purchase on reality –
primarily with the present-day examples of ‘sovereignty games’ in mind.
So how do states sustain their borders? The strategy of the paper is to
propose a definition of boundaries where borders appear as a sub-category.
On this basis, we envisage a field of actions which states can engage in.
Then we will identify theoretically a range of possibilities as to why states
might want to engage in ‘bordering’ – or, we will choose to say later, to
‘inscribe’ their borders. We then reformulate states’ difficulties with bor-
dering as a condition resulting from ‘disaggregation’ between the various
planes of inscription of their borders. Finally we take sovereignty games in
Europe as an instance of when states engage in the types of action previously
formulated in theory. The upshot of this is to indicate that our theory of bor-
dering practices can cover a range of those contemporary practices which
are untheorised in existing ways of looking at states and their borders.
The ‘Lines-in-the-Sand’ critical agenda calls for alternative epistemolo-
gies, ontologies and topologies3 to those promoted by ‘the politics of the
line’. For some, this requires that we aim to deconstruct and challenge taken-
for-granted assumptions about state borders guaranteeing order and justice.4
But in addition, the very persistence of a ‘politics of the line’ requires an
explanation. The level of violence and repression, past and present, devoted
to fixing and holding borders is plain to see.5 Indeed, there are good reasons
why borders have been termed ‘scars of history’.6
But a fundamental theoretical inquiry needs to start from the inherent
difficulty of discriminating one identity, be it that of a state or of anything
else, from any other.7 So we begin with an assumption that discriminations
are certain to be made, but nothing can be assumed as to the where or the
how. In other words, no one particular border or one particular way that the
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border is marked is certain. Thus, the amplified difficulties of the present era
require a renewed account of the conditions of possibility of states’ bordering
practices.
THE PROBLEMATIC OF A THEORY OF BORDERING PRACTICES
Borders as a Sub-category of Boundaries
We need first to clarify what borders are. This can effectively be done by
considering them as a more formalised and territorialised sub-category of
‘boundaries’ – a term which, significantly, can be used indifferently about
various kinds of entity beside states: territorial, social, personal, etc., both
collective and individual.8
We then need an abstract definition of a boundary. This we draw from
a text by Grahame Thompson9:
Boundaries exist as linked sites of difference and local oppositions.
Differences and local oppositions are ‘connected up’; yoked together to
form entities. Thus, boundaries exist ‘before’ entities. In principle, then,
boundaries could exist without entities – they are simply sites of differ-
ence, neighborhoods of oppositions. Members and strangers only exist
in relationship to boundaries, as several dimensions of difference are
linked up, connected to form a boundary. Members are placed ‘inside’
the entity-to-be, indeed members are made up by the establishment of
that boundary.
Thompson himself extrapolates some of the implications of this definition for
our goal regarding the nature of borders, and hence for the actions of states.
In a border so conceived there is much that is changeable. Any ‘point’ may
disappear, or change form or meaning, with implications for the bounded
entity of the (political) unit(s) lying on either side. The mode of articulation
of ‘points’ in the boundary, or their connectedness may change, increase or
fade. Furthermore, a boundary can be sustained or undermined from either
side, implying that bordering will normally have implications for bounded
entities on both sides.
In normal usage, all borders are boundaries, but not all boundaries
are borders. Boundaries of personal space, for example, would need to be
unusually explicit if one was to call them ‘borders’. So the key step to make
a boundary into a border is that it become more explicit, more evident, more
formal, more thing-like. But states specialise in formality: from the grandeur
of the monarch and the state buildings; to the legal and constitutional doc-
uments (so carefully prepared, revised and announced); to the meticulously
drafted inter-state treaties; to the public offices in military, police and state
service; to the public finances. All that adds up to the state’s ‘legitimate
right to coercion within its territory’. A fortiori, it is natural that the actions
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of states should be formalised and territorialised. So, we can say that state
borders are particularly explicit and formalised boundaries, and that states
are peculiarly well-adapted to engage in border-making that is solider than
‘mere’ boundary-making.10
Bordering Practice
Our theory focuses on theorising state ‘bordering practices’: those activi-
ties engaged in by states that constitute, sustain or modify borders between
states (principally their own, but effectively others’ borders as well – primar-
ily in cooperation with them, but sometimes by imposition). This is not to
deny that non-state actors are relevant in our conceptualisation. Far from it:
state bordering practices are to a large degree performed in interaction with
other types of non-state actors, processes and organisations.11 Furthermore,
this kind of activity could be initiated from one side of a border or the other.
Generally, indeed, such activities are interactions, including actions which
entail discursive exchanges. But, even if bordering is in many instances per-
formed by a mix of state and non-state actors, our attention here is primarily
on bordering by states.
The term bordering practices12 is especially able to embrace present-day
uncertainties. For it poses something before any determinate border: namely,
the activities which have the effect of (in the words of the earlier formu-
lation) ‘constituting, sustaining or modifying borders’. ‘Practices’ necessarily
include a range from the most explicit and active to subtler and/or passive
activities so as ‘to constitute . . .’, etc. Thus, ‘bordering practices’ cover not
only actions plainly intended to ‘border’ (e.g., incorporating Jerusalem as the
capital of the state of Israel) but also less prominent activities whose side-
effects include constituting and/or reconstituting, etc., borders. An instance
of the latter would be agreeing on common standards for the railway line
running between Germany and France; for this amends the functioning of
transit across the formal border between the two countries. Note also that in
any particular instance, activities may be more or less successful in achieving
their pre-set goals, and may, likewise, be more or less intentionally pursued
by the given actors.
Given the above definitions, we can plot the range of instances for what
might be included in ‘bordering’ against levels of ‘activeness’. The range is
considerable. From concluding a military action so as to clear and fence a
border, to its reversal in a treaty of union with the neighbouring state; from
meeting those approaching the border with warning signs or threats, to reor-
ganising administration of movements across the border more smoothly –
with or without invisible monitoring of vehicles or persons; from amassing
troops and defences at the border, to jointly reorganising transit, to open-
ing the border and closing the control posts. All these, and more could be
‘bordering practices’: that is, practices which ‘constitute, sustain or modify
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borders’. Hence the range embraces ‘border-making’, ‘border-sustaining’
and de-bordering actions under the term ‘bordering practices’, where all may
or may not have the character of the border directly in their sights.
The Functions of Borders/Boundaries
Borders are, as we have already observed, a sub-category of ‘boundaries’.
So, we can determine a lot about the character of borders via the idea of
boundaries – hence the slash between the two words in our sub-title. But
we must bear in mind that borders would exhibit plainer manifestations than
boundaries – such as fences, supervision, official records and so on. Insofar
as borders are a sub-category of boundaries, it can safely be assumed that the
competent agents’ gains or losses are similar for sustaining, etc., boundaries
as for sustaining borders. Only more so. For, if the difference is primarily
that borders are more manipulable and more manifest, they will be easier
instruments for the activities of making or modifying boundaries – especially
for activities on the part of states. Hence, we can usefully ask: What functions
can borders/boundaries fulfil for states and state actors seeking to make,
modify or sustain them?
In the post–World War II environment of suspicion for all forms of
nationalism, the positive functions of borders were rather passed over. The
functionalism of Mitrany and the neo-functionalism of Lindberg and Haas,
assumed that discriminations between nation-states were fundamentally irra-
tional, and the functional future lay in leaving that kind of thing behind.
Karl Deutsch’s work in the 1950s likewise found the pursuit of security for
individual nations to be dysfunctional, so that the future again lay in over-
coming the gaps between nations. Taking a historical view on security in
the 1980s, Kratochwil realised that state borders may have been functional
in former times, while holding that they were less and less able to function
to ensure security in the post-colonial world. Kratochwil quotes Luhmann
approvingly on the principle of the functionality of boundaries, to the effect
that borders are functional in themselves, even though they may or may not
fulfil the functions accorded to them13:
Boundaries (and a fortiori, borders) ‘reduce the points with the environ-
ment, thus allowing the internal conditioning of various relations with the
environment. Only where boundaries do exist, relations between system
and environment can increase their complexity, their differentiation and
their controlled mutability’.
In spite of the late twentieth-century scepticism on borders, we are entitled
to theorise about the positive functions of borders, and their utility to state
agents promoting them.
We can first observe that borders help fulfil epistemological conditions.
Borders produce particular conditions for understanding ‘reality’. We who
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are inside the border are also expected to possess greater knowledge of
insiders than of outsiders, which in turn reduces uncertainties regarding
our common knowledge on the inside. The border is frequently a bulwark
sustaining commonly agreed measures of reality (such as national-currency
measures for inflation or relative welfare). The border slices the world up
into different pieces of reality that we cannot know equally well. That
increases as well the plausibility of any assertion regarding the circum-
stances, gains or losses within our border. Hence, other things being equal,
borders help promote the idea that there are fewer uncertainties in commu-
nications between insiders by comparison with communications with those
on the outside. This leads to an assumption that we will be able to agree
on the terms used to evaluate changes and preferences – even the order of
priorities, which is a pre-condition of political decisions. Put in a nutshell,
the border provides conditions for greater certainty and agreement for those
within it.
Thompson also makes explicit an ontological claim for the
border/boundary which is implicit in post-structuralism’s prioritisation of dif-
ferences as against commonalities: namely, that ‘. . . borders exist “before”
entities . . .’ – that is to say, borders are ontologically prior to specific enti-
ties. Borders help constitute the way we conceive the world. This can be
demonstrated, inter alia, on the basis of the epistemological claims above.
For those epistemological consequences of boundaries provide key onto-
logical pre-conditions for the continuity of the given social particular as an
integrated entity; and hence also for its identity.14 The ‘fact’ of the border
helps produce shared understandings of the identities of particulars, both
internal and external to the particular itself. This includes understandings of
internal variations and sub-categories (constituencies, classes . . .) between
insiders/members of the given social particular. The self-identities of mem-
bers and sub-categories are grounded in, and thus far validated, by seeing
those particulars in relation to each other.15 Likewise, the boundary sustains
any determination of the collectivity (the ‘nation’, or whatever it may be)
whose interests may be the basis for decisions and actions on its behalf.
This, as Rokkan noted,16 is especially significant in democratic collectivities,
where a large self-aware demos is postulated as the ground for decisions
that need to accord in some way with the preference of an indeterminable
category, the ordinary mass of the people.
The above ontological effects of borders yield yet further consequences.
For borders provide pre-conditions for determinations of the situation of
insiders relative to outsiders: claims regarding presumed and/or potential
different conditions (be it better or worse) for insiders than for outsiders.17
The same could be said of any impression of greater/lesser (or poten-
tially greater/lesser) welfare than outsiders. Only with these kinds of claims
and impressions in place, can an additional, politically important category
of knowledge have meaning: assertions about potential improvements or
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deteriorations in conditions for the inside.18 If the existence of the subjects
who experience comparative well-being were not given, we would not find
meaning in headlines such as ‘Danish schools worst on PISA tests’.19 A fortiori
threats which it may be necessary to protect against.
From this last finding, we may further extrapolate that borders help
provide conditions for decisions as to what is of value. And that is what
makes possible ‘actorness’. The boundary’s epistemological, evaluative and
decisional effects are needed for decisions to be made on the part of a
collective particular, and hence for actors to act on its behalf – and, a fortiori,
for states to be constituted as actors. These decisional frameworks underpin
indicators of benefit or dysfunction agreed upon for the inside. They define
parameters for actions in relation to others, both inside and outside.20 Finally,
borders and boundaries clarify who may participate in any decision made in
the name of the collective whole. In short, boundaries are a precondition for
decision and action at the level of the constituted whole – especially where
decision-making is undertaken in a ‘constitutionalised’ manner, such as in a
constitutional democracy.
We have thus proceeded from a minimal characterisation of the
border/boundary to a specification of functions fulfilled by possessing, main-
taining or modifying border/boundaries. Those, we deduce, are functions of
the border, which underpin the various choices regarding borders, together
with bordering practices by states.
The possibility of meeting an ‘Other’ is always implicit in the activity
of inscribing a line of difference. But the ironic corollary of such meetings
is that while the Other can be initially experienced as, precisely, ‘Other’, at
the same time he/she/it/they open the question of whether they are indeed
different, and hence to what extent the given identity determined by the bor-
der is stable.21 Insofar as those on the far side are determined as an ‘Other’ –
independent, different, alien – the border implies the risks and perpetually
re-establishes a degree of certainty in relations to what lies outside. But the
issue can never be definitively closed. We can see this in migratory bor-
der movements, wherever human movements are constructed as a group of
‘intruders’ with demands, entitlements to charity, alien language, unknown
culture, or whatever.22 As contemporary state borders become more varie-
gated, awareness of such movements must constantly raise the issue of the
distinctness of the collective identity which it is the overall function of state
bordering practice to resolve.
It would therefore be a mistake to interpret border practices on the part
of states as only a ‘rational goal’ in the sense implied by rational choice the-
ory. That is to suppose that the border/boundary can provide gains which
actors can anticipate and will hold desirable, such that they may adopt par-
ticular courses of action to attain them. Rather, the border emerges as a
condition of possibility for being constituted as an entity or as an actor capa-
ble of formulating desirable outcomes and pursuing them. In other words,
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the continuity of the boundary is a condition for the continuous identity of
the whole whose interest is to be pursued by any ‘rational decisions’ more
narrowly understood. We believe, however, unlike the options for a rational
choice as normally understood, action in pursuit of the goal of sustaining
or modifying the articulations of the border will feed back upon the very
identity of the actor who pursues it. A border of some kind is a precondition
of being an actor, but in many actions the border itself is in play. So there
may be no consistent actor-identity between inception and completion of the
course of action undertaken. In this sense, the rational-choice model oper-
ates only on the surface of what is happening when activities that regard
bordering are decided upon.
The special status of the gains of the border/boundary – as conditions of
possibility – means, furthermore, that we cannot formulate a choice for actors
to possess a border or not. Bordering in some form is unavoidable for actors to
be actors. Supposed ‘gains’ postulated for having a border underdetermine
the activities of border-making and/or modifying. Borders are conditions
of possibility of decisions; because bordering activities underpin conditions
where the identity of the social particular is sustained or modified. Social
particulars that share knowledge, values, identity and hence interests, rely on
their borders/boundaries in order to possess those dimensions, and likewise
to be actors (or, for that matter, to be the objects of action by others). Activity,
deliberate or otherwise, to modify or reformulate their borders/boundaries
will yield the gain of continuous existence in some form or other, even
though sometimes modifying its articulations.
INSCRIBING BORDERS
Whether to have some kind of border or not cannot be the choice, as borders
for states are precondition for the possibility of choice. Why that should be
so thorny for them has been recently articulated with a Derridian insight
by Nick Vaughan-Williams.23 States are perpetually embroiled in biopoli-
tics by their efforts to control human persons through their domination of
territory. Under the heading of ‘Alternative border imaginaries’, this leads
Vaughan-Williams to evince a concept of ‘the generalized biopolitical border’,
primarily in the light of Agamben’s account of the fundamental biopolitical
nature of state sovereignty. But this is pursued with a take on all discrim-
inations, derived from Derrida’s early work24 – that of Agamben included.
In Derrida’s deconstructivist understanding, no discrimination of any kind
can be final.
If states are involved in combining government of territory together with
government of persons, then they cannot rest content with any established
determination of their borders as final. States cannot live without borders, but
cannot afford to abandon the business of determining and re-determining
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borders. So, rather than looking at any supposed state decision to have bor-
ders, we should be looking for variations in articulations of the borders that
states make. An analytically powerful point of departure would be the dif-
ferent materials, physical as well as symbolic, that need to be drawn upon
in any determination of borders. In a word, we should study the ways in
which states ‘inscribe’ their borders. We make the categorisation of planes
that follows for analytical purposes. This is a limited set of more-or-less
independent fields, which need to be examined separately to get a purchase
on the different ways that states can ‘pick’ their borders. These planes, we
contend, provide a grid through which we can understand bordering prac-
tices by states. In short, a state’s choices concern which planes to inscribe
their borders upon, and how to formulate inscriptions that will be ‘read’ as
intended by the various addressees inside and outside.
It is relatively straightforward to draw up a list of familiar fields of state
activity which may also be understood as planes for the ‘inscription of bor-
ders’, and which we can go on to use in a grid to observe states’ bordering
practices. The most obvious is to build on topography. A border may be
drawn upon the territorial plane: e.g., a mountain ridge or water course that
is be modulated from a mere topographic feature to a border. That there is
bordering activity at work here can be seen from the change in meaning
that crossing the given topographic feature then undergoes: from ‘trading
across’ (when a single market is agreed), for example, to ‘smuggling’ (when
a good is declared illegal). In a different register, drawing a boundary around
one area of sea together with certain waterways divides zones of movement
that are subject to different treatment – as, for example, spatial differenti-
ation between Roman commerce and non-Roman zones of barbarism and
conflict.25
Familiar also, but less straightforward conceptually or politically, is
inscription upon economic relations. The difficulty here is that these have
always been at one and the same time marked by, but not fully subject to
states’ border inscriptions – and states themselves have been parties to that.
States have long sought to channel economic relations around the presuppo-
sition of their borders. In doing this, they have accepted (both in practice and
in theory) that economic relations have an autonomous dynamic, including
the possibility of evading the given state border. The perpetual choice that
states have between banning a trade across the border and charging a toll
on it illustrates the tension. This is ostensibly the clearest instance of duality
arising from the duality of inside with outside. Political issues about what
can, or should, be inscribed by states on the plane of economic relations
are the stuff of modern liberal states’ political and economic debate pri-
marily because the policies arrived, even while softening it, always mark the
border.26 Furthermore, it is a border that different kinds of outside will have a
hand in: market forces, business elites, foreign powers, border-overstepping
social processes of all kinds.
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Export and import tolls are payments that permit the movement of
goods across a state border, with a share going to the state. International
organisations such as the WTO are established by treaties between bordered
states which affirm what their borders will or will not restrict movements.
Increasingly integrated production and commerce at world and/or regional
levels has recently altered the balance between inscribing divisions and
managing movement along state borders; but that has definitely not abol-
ished the state’s role.27 The border does not disappear when international
trade is liberalised; properly speaking, it is a condition of trade being
‘international’.
The nexus between economic activity and topographic borders brings
us face to face with a further duality central to the nature of the border. The
border may be inscribed territorially, but it is manifest in human behaviour.
As Foucault puts it in reference to territory, when introducing precisely the
layered complexity of the relationships involved28:
If it is true that sovereignty is basically inscribed and functions within a
territory, and that the idea of sovereignty over an unpopulated territory
is not only a juridically and politically acceptable idea, but one that is
absolutely accepted and primary, nevertheless the effective, real, daily
operations of the actual exercise of sovereignty point to a certain multi-
plicity, but one which is treated as the multiplicity of subjects, or [as] the
multiplicity of a people.
As we extend our list of planes for inscription further, we progress to those
where inscription upon their domestic populations by states-as-actors is more
and more intangible. That is to say: we meet this tension within the spatial-
ity produced by bordering more and more as we formulate further planes
for inscription. Whereas topography operates directly upon territory with
corollaries for human beings, many of the planes we describe below operate
alone upon human bodies, or even human consciousnesses with a view to
constituting the spatially bounded entity.
Frequently associated with the topographic plane is that inscribed by
coercive force. For, in effect, that often means to draw a border between
one zone where the power of one organised coercive force holds sway, and
the next zone. Though seemingly close, the topographic and the coercive
planes are in fact distinct – as can be seen from the historical evolution in
the topologies implicit in the practice of coercive force. To amplify this last
point: the armed forces of a modern, Western state are likely to act primarily
in concert with those of other states. Each formally belongs in a distinct
topographically bounded territory; but they will hardly act to enforce the
border between their territories. Arranging coercive forces along the national
boundary has largely ceased in some areas of the world. Notably, within the
European Union where the creation of the ‘Schengen border-free zone’ has
led to the abolition of border control within the Schengen territory. More
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generally, there has been an evolution over the longer term from ‘protecting
a national territory’ by fixed garrisons of armed personnel; to ‘defending the
open seas’ by a roaming capacity to interdict movements; to ‘holding air-
space’ by an ability to observe and intrude over a zone way beyond the
given topographic border.29
Normally, à la Weber, formalised statehood is represented on a plane
of legitimised coercive force. Borders help states to mark the monopoly of
the legitimate threat of violence through the combination of military/police
forces and a plausible claim that its use is ‘legitimate’. For Western states, it
has been crucial to divide territorially demarcated zones of mutual exclusive
legitimate coercion – in other words, to demarcate activities between dif-
ferent state sovereignties.30 In the eyes of other sovereign states, effective
coercive control over the domestic population has been a longer stand-
ing requirement for formal recognition than legitimacy within the domestic
population themselves.31
That form of inscription of the border interconnects with another: the
jurisdictional framework, whereby territories and/or activities are deemed to
fall within the territorially defined remit of formalised rules and procedures.
Again, in essence, this plane is distinct from the previous one. While the
territorial-legal is rooted in authority congruent with a bordered space cover-
ing all those present and all events within, jurisdiction per se can have other
ranges: such as personal (referring to authority over a person, regardless of
their location – e.g., in a number of Western countries, sexual relations with
minors) and subject-matter jurisdictions (referring to authority over the topic
of the matters involved – e.g., torture). It is evident from extra-territorial leg-
islation, as well as from international trade law, that the jurisdictional plane
can easily have a range different from a state’s effective legitimate coercion.
Linguistic commonalities can clearly mark sites of difference by drawing
a border around one group that speaks ‘the same’ language and the others.
This plane has always been more awkward to inscribe any border at all, as
linguistic practices easily escape close control from above – as the oddity
of the notion of ‘incursions’ by one language into another indicates. Not
that that has prevented states and national-minded intellectuals from making
the attempt by formulating correct rules for national languages.32 The device
of a lingua franca, or of a sacred language, has frequently provided an
alternative plane on which to inscribe a different border – for example, Latin
in bordering early Western Christendom from the heathen world.
More recently, the development of rights for linguistic minorities within
and across states has re-enforced the idea that linguistic commonalities help
constitute borders in a way that is not consistent with state sovereignty.
Language rights have become an issue of contention within several European
countries, and as a consequence also between neighbouring states. Disputes
have arisen in some countries where the status of the state language has been
perceived as threatened in regions where minorities are present in numbers
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and perhaps also in political life. As part of this process, the Council of
Europe adopted The European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages
(ECRML) in 1992 to protect and promote historical regional and minority
languages in Europe. The Charter protects linguistic minorities and may also
function as a way for state authorities to achieve a ‘margin of appreciation’ –
for instance over street names and other topographical indicators.33 Hence,
while linguistic boundaries were earlier an important instrument in the hands
of state authorities to create national cohesion, the Charter works as a way
of qualifying linguistic border-drawing by states.
Cultural proximities constitute a related, yet perhaps more still difficult
plane for states to operate upon. ‘External intrusion’ into supposedly distinct
national cultures is so widespread that most national orders exhibit profound
difficulty in associating national identities with cultural commonalities.34 To
draw a border around one group such that it has ‘the same’ cultural refer-
ence points (written literature, musical and dance styles, habits of socialising)
relative to others has proved difficult since the inception of nations. The
unexpected extension of cultural Americanisation under the auspices of
‘European’ cultural policy is a striking example of the perverse effects on
this plane of border inscriptions. It cannot even be seen to have an ori-
gin in the will of another, ‘external’ actor – often referred to in shorthand
as ‘Hollywood’. As Kroes argues, Americanisation is not simply passive
assimilation at the behest of the outsider.35
Not only states, but also supranational bodies may seek to take a stake in
cultural policy. Notably, the European Union has sought to create European
Union citizens with a shared, transnational civic culture, related to their
shared rights (such as the all-important right of movement across national
borders), and even – more controversially – shared symbols, such as the
European Union flag. As Moreira presents it, the cultural policy of the EU is
organised around three pillars, which may not be consistent with each other:
economic benefits of transnational cooperation; transnational awareness of
European heritage; and union citizenship.36 The ultimate goal of EU cultural
policy is to strengthen the sense of belonging to the EU, which is necessarily
transnational.
The conundrum of ‘local knowledge’: Knowledge, a concept which inter-
sects cultural commonalities, can just as clearly mark distinction across a
border. Some things are characteristically known amongst those on the inside
and not known to those on the outside. The ‘conundrum’ is this: Whether
certain items, or types of knowledge can be said to ‘belong’ to one or other
side of a boundary determined by whoever will most readily acquire it? We
comfortably accept that some prior conditions – training, experience, no less
than milieu, etc. – can be desirable, or even necessary to achieve certain
categories of insight, scientific, artistic or otherwise. Conversely, we expect
knowledge to be communicable across boundaries, ergo not confined to one
side of any border. Nonetheless, regardless of difficulties it implies for the
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principle behind our rationalist epistemology, items of knowledge certainly
have a place on the list of the planes where borders can be inscribed.
Instances of the difficulties of universal versus national ‘knowledge’
are seen from international and supra-national bodies, such as the mem-
bers of the OECD. Again, the OECD’s so-called ‘PISA’37 tests offered the
example of cross-state, universalised comparisons of national education sys-
tems, and of the perverse effects of creating any ‘universal’ standards for
knowledge. Comparing reading, mathematics and science literacy of fifteen-
year-old students in thirty-one countries implied the creation universal of
items of knowledge. But they have travelled with difficulty – due not only
to language barriers, but also to different national traditions and ways of
categorising and classifying the world.38
A further instance of the ambivalence of bordering knowledge is pro-
vided by the ranking system of international journals.39 The ‘universal’
rankings became policy-relevant nationally in the 2000s, due to the mar-
ketisation of higher education and the increased mobility of students.40 For
administrators and politicians, the quantitative social-scientific information
provided by these lists has become an indispensable part of policy-planning.
Yet, as tools of symbolic power, ranking-lists reinforce pre-conceived ideas
for certain users. For others, university rankings have become part of the
global higher education landscape. They present a certain state of affairs
as inevitable, shaping reality in the field of higher education. The universal
values have contributed to the creation of a new ‘status economy’, which
sets policies in higher education and innovation.41 Global hierarchies and
norms are now reproduced, and further legitimised, by a variety of research
institutions specialising in the production of information in terms of these
hierarchies. They are funded by nation-states or media corporations. Due to
their global coverage and high visibility, these lists are causing significant
shifts in national policies to keep up with similar policy scripts and the myth
of modernity that is part of its power.42 With their common norms and beliefs
about causality, these symbolic-power tools portray the world in a uniform
manner. The figures produced and the perceptions of ‘competition’ that they
communicate tend to lock state policy actors in, leaving little room for policy
alternatives.43
Disaggregation of Borders/Boundaries
We take this to be a minimal list of different planes for inscribing state bor-
ders. At the least, it is enough to take us further to the next claim that our
theory of state bordering is founded on. We have been accustomed to group
all these distinct planes together without further ado, and expect that spe-
cific outcomes at the territorial, economic, coercive, legal, linguistic, cultural
and knowledge planes will fall into place alongside each other, correspond-
ing to nation-states’ borders. Their comfortable aggregation has indeed been
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palpable evidence of the solidity of national-state identities. States, in partic-
ular, have been accustomed to bundle together distinct planes of bordering,
and hence to assign them to one internally coherent set that can comfortably
be undertaken by one actor, namely the state itself.
It is vital, however, to repeat that the different planes of inscription of
the border are theoretically distinct: for that shows that the alignment of the
planes cannot be taken for granted. In other words, it is not necessarily the
case that inscribing a border in terms of any one plane (territory enclosed,
economic ties sustained, linguistic practices in common, or whatever) will
produce a border congruent with that produced on other planes. It follows
that over the course of history, we must expect to find many instances where
the border in the different planes is not ‘aggregated’. And the histories of the
welding of territory and population by rising modern states already point to
how difficult it has been in the past to achieve something like an aggregation
of the border on distinct planes.44
Our formulation that ‘it is not necessarily the case that inscribing a bor-
der in terms of any one plane will produce a border congruent with those
produced in other planes’ expresses the problematic of state bordering prac-
tices in different terms. It also provides an explanatory schema for what
indeed appears prima facie to be happening. For, the difficulties of the bor-
der as expounded in our introduction can be formulated as a disaggregation
of those ‘planes’ upon which boundaries may be inscribed. The range of
phenomena referred to as our starting point under the titles of ‘globalisa-
tion’ and ‘integration’ can be seen from the perspective of state bordering
activity as inscription. Whereas one agent (one state) on its own could ear-
lier plausibly inscribe a single boundary along different planes that might be
aggregated fairly easily; recent developments have progressively magnified
the potential for disaggregation between the borders on distinct planes upon
which borders may be inscribed.
Yet, whilst conditions for bordering may change, the underlying assump-
tions have remained. The familiar circumstances referred to suggest, then, it
is trickier than it formerly was to attain an ‘aggregated’ border on the dif-
ferent planes. Instances are easy to find – and we have seen some already.
Yet, the necessity for states to engage in bordering in the terms set out in
the second part remains. We can postulate that state bordering practices con-
tinue, but they are exercised in an environment where states themselves are
increasingly under pressure to manoeuvre amongst disaggregated planes,
upon which they may inscribe their borders.
‘PICKING AND CHOOSING’ SOVEREIGN STATE BORDERS
We have developed an account of how various territorial and functional
state borders do not necessarily correspond (do not ‘aggregate’), and how
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the capacity to alter them may lie with various forces and authorities, which
can overlap. While the various planes on which state sovereignty is inscribed
do not fit neatly on top of each other, states have not surrendered their will
or all of their capacity to act on, or manipulate their border inscriptions. Thus
we arrive at an account of the arena where states45 will ‘pick and choose’ the
border: not the presuppositions, but the expressions of their borders. Given
the wider environment, their best option is often to amend the way that
their border is articulated, that is to make a choice of how to inscribe which
versions of their borders. To complete the picture, two final additions can
be made: the historic consequence of this for the dominant concept of state
sovereignty; and how states currently adapt inscriptions of the border(s) so
as to have them ‘read’ optimally from the state’s point of view – that is, to
convey the given states’ preferred meaning to the various addressees of the
inscriptions.
State Sovereignty and ‘Disaggregated Planes’
When we talk about the sovereign state and its many planes of bordering,
we need to contrast this with received international law definition of the
sovereign state as a territorial entity:
A state is an entity that has a defined territory and a permanent pop-
ulation, under the control of its own government, and that engages
in, or has the capacity to engage in, formal relations with other such
entities.46
From this perspective, sovereignty is the exclusive right to exercise, within
a specifiable territory, the functions of a government and be answerable to
no higher authority. For a state to be a sovereign in this way, it is necessary
to specify a territorial border: to inscribe a border on the topographic plane.
But sovereign statehood also entails inscribing other types of borders. The
requirement of a ‘permanent population’ thus refers to topological47 mani-
festations in a demarcated social group – normally, with bounded economic
practices, security expectations, culture, language, knowledge and, in sum,
identity. Finally, this ideal requires a ‘government’, i.e., formal and effec-
tive decision-making capacity over that area/population/set of practices –
an idea traditionally linked to the Weberian notion of a monopoly of the
use of legitimate coercive force. In this conception of the state, the differ-
ent planes are indeed assumed to aggregate, i.e., to be congruent with each
other. The demarcation of the population and its practices is expected to fit
the territorial border, which will follow the demarcation of formal and polit-
ical competences and decision-making processes. Thus, the aggregation of
border inscriptions appears indispensable for the received idea of the state
sovereignty.
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Sovereignty is often discussed as a Western construction, an invention,
due to European philosophers, kings and jurists. Yet, when viewed from
our perspective on state bordering, it is clear that disaggregated borders and
authority have a longer history, and that bordering is central to most accounts
of political authority across time and space. In Europe, not only did there
exist earlier forms of sovereignty,48 there was a long evolution after this to
reach the standard, specifically modern conception of territorial sovereignty.
This was intimately associated with the development of specifically modern
secularity49 and identity.50
Outside Europe, as anthropologists were the first to bring to our atten-
tion, the picture is even more varied.51 Japanese political history provides
an example of this.52 During the Tokugawa period (1603–1868), Japan was,
by Western standards, a nation without absolute, fixed borders or clearly
defined sovereignty. The emperor in Kyoto was merely a symbolic suzerain;
actual governmental power within the main islands was divided between the
Tokugawa shogunate (bakufu) and about 270 autonomous daimyo domains
(han), while the peripheries – Hokkaido and its environs to the north, the
Ryukyu Islands to the south – were subordinated to the Japanese polity yet
not considered to be integral parts of it.
While early modern Japan’s borders may appear ambiguous in hind-
sight, ‘at the time they formed a coherent system in which social status
ordered groups within the core polity while notions of civilization and bar-
barism defined identities in the core and periphery’.53 In a formation that
resembles European feudalism, status-, power- and identity-bordering was
quite distinctive. Yet this system could express a claim to political borders,
making it possible for the Japan of the Tokugawa period to fit in with foreign
relations in the modern nation-state system. Borders were inscribed quite dif-
ferently from what we expect of ‘modern’ states: linguistic and values borders
were uppermost in preserving Japan’s isolation from close involvement with
Western societies; yet decentralised power could be effective in bringing ter-
ritorially extended authority over the rural population. Holding this ‘Japan’ of
power-holders together was a demanding culture of dignity for the military
elite, which valued the emperor’s imprimatur above all.
Even though the border is central to Western state-building, the image
of the state as a bordered power container54 is theoretically problematic
and empirically misleading. In the course of the twentieth century, many
additional, at first sight aggregated, planes have been even added to the
territorial. Bauman describes the resulting structure as a ‘tripod of sovereign-
ties’, built on the territorial groundwork, which has latterly had to be
abandoned.55 The spatio-temporal construct ‘state sovereignty’ is elegant and
time-honoured, but problematic. Whilst it cannot be wholly dispensed with,
it no longer reflects the ways authority and power are organised. At the
time of the early modern transition from late feudalism, state sovereignty
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might have been the answer rulers were looking for. Nowadays, states are
intersected by many border-infringing processes.
The non-aggregation of the borders is challenging the received view
of the sovereign status of ‘sovereign’-state borders. But, we argue, whereas
the received view of sovereignty has yet to be fully or formally abandoned,
in reality states can nonetheless be expected to adapt the realities of non-
aggregation. States will manage the circumstances so as to articulate their
border differentially and so retain the ability to discriminate, control (or avoid
control), and take responsibility (or avoid it), for some of the articulations
which are on our earlier list. In the European Union, for example, we see
developing forms of picking and choosing when it comes to the idea of force
and territory. These activities cash out in cross-border cooperation between
national police authorities in the EU member states when they combat drug-
and car-smuggling, human trafficking and child pornography.
The abolition of border controls provided for by the Schengen agree-
ment arguably produced a ‘security deficit’, which enabled ‘perpetrators of
criminal acts to move as freely as law abiding citizens’. So, the Schengen
agreement was amended to allow for ‘hot pursuit’ across borders (where
police are pursuing a criminal who is on the run). This allows police officers
from one member state to cross the border and operate inside the territory
of another member state, provided that they coordinate their activities with
the national police authorities.56 Today, the EU member states have joint bor-
der patrols, joint surveillance operations and joint investigation teams. There
is increasing exchange of information and pooling of equipment; national
police forces have direct access to other member states’ fingerprint, DNA
and vehicle registration databases. Within the EU there is no such thing as
a ‘power container state’ when it comes to the use of legitimate force over
territory.
In sum, the disaggregation of the planes of bordering does not so much
stymie the bordering practices of sovereign states as much as it provides
a broader palette for inscription on distinct planes. New kinds of border-
ing, and more specifically of articulating borders, are an integral part of the
contemporary transformation in global and regional authority. Especially in
Europe, there is constant jockeying between levels of authority about ways
that states may and may not articulate their borders. By examining how states
‘pick and choose’ their borders, we are now better able to grasp how modern
statehood manifests itself and sovereignty is articulated.
Who Conveys What to Whom?: Bordering as a ‘Sovereignty Game’
The notion of disaggregated planes redirects sovereignty, and a fortiori state
bordering practices, away from claims to the permanent possession of cer-
tain qualities. It moves states towards the activities recently characterised as
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sovereignty games: that is to say, the instrumentalisation of claims to legal
and political authority by states and other actors in the face of globalisation,
regionalisation and international legal regimes.57 If we consider bordering
as inscriptions upon diverse planes, the ‘game’ consists of picking the opti-
mal modes of inscription of the border that are available. This often implies
manipulating domestic and foreign audiences.
Let us first consider who engages in bordering practices. As R. B. J.
Walker notes,58 traditional International Relations theory sees state-players
severally or collectively as sovereign bordering actors. Courts, both national
and international, may be seen as such bordering actors when it comes
both to inscribing and challenging state borders in the legal realm. The EU
provides instances of state institutions, notably member states’ constitutional
courts, defending their national legal order with reasoning that nonetheless
points away from it, and towards the collective decision of all the member
states. This has been particularly striking during the 1990s and 2000s where
the treaty revisions have become increasingly controversial and politicised.
On 26 November 2008, for example, the Czech Constitutional Court
handed down a unanimous opinion finding that the Lisbon Treaty was com-
patible with the Czech constitutional order.59 The decision was one of the
most significant decisions in the Court’s history and had EU-wide implica-
tions. Underlining the necessity of European integration in the globalised
world, the Court resorted to the concept of ‘pooled sovereignty’. The Court
noted that
it is more a linguistic question whether to describe the integration pro-
cess as a ‘loss’ of a part of sovereignty, or competences, or, somewhat
more fittingly, as, e.g., ‘lending, ceding’ of part of the competence of a
sovereign. . . .
[The] transfer of certain state competences that arises from the free will
of the sovereign and will continue to be exercised with the sovereign’s
participation in a manner that is agreed upon in advance and is review-
able, is not ex definitionem a conceptual weakening of the sovereignty
of a state, but, on the contrary, it can lead to its strengthening within
the joint actions of an integrated whole. The EU’s integration process is
not taking place in a radical manner that would generally mean the ‘loss’
of national sovereignty; rather, it is an evolutionary process and, among
other things, a reaction to the increasing globalization in the world. (See
paras. 104 and 109 of the Judgment)
The decision reflects picking and choosing under circumstance where the
planes on which borders are inscribed have become disaggregated. It also
harks back to the point made in the Introduction to the effect that bordering
is not an action, but an interaction. For alongside their endorsement of
‘pooled sovereignty’, the Court gave voice to a more traditional notion of
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sovereignty, stressing that the Lisbon Treaty explicitly enables a member
state freely to withdraw from the Union.60
Indeed, states’ bordering practices always involve communicating, often
selectively and strategically, to various audiences inside and outside the bor-
der. The activity of inscribing a border cannot be seen as complete unless
account is taken of the meaning conveyed by the inscription. Different con-
structions with the same border-inscription may be associated with different
addressees. No politically intelligent attempt to inscribe a border can be
made, therefore, without an awareness that different ‘audiences’, ‘reader-
ships’ or ‘publics’ may interpret the inscription differently. Actors engaging
in bordering must therefore seek to control this variable. Thus states will
seek to define, or even to keep separate, distinct audiences to whom they
intend distinct messages.
This dimension is often evident in what Adler-Nissen refers to as the
‘organized hypocrisy’ of EU member states vis-à-vis their own publics as
against their Brussels colleagues.61 One of the most radical challenges to
the idea of clearly delineated populations is the ‘free movement of people’,
one of the four core freedoms of the EU. Yet unsaying the free mobility
of persons across EU borders also helps structure national discourses of
bordering. For some states, the Schengen regime (abolishing controls and
checks at national borders between EU member states) is so problematic that
they have negotiated opt-outs, national treaty exemptions, which at first sight
seem to reinstall the border. When the United Kingdom was granted an opt-
out from the Schengen agreement this exemption appeared to be absolute.
For a significant majority on the British domestic scene, led by Conservatives
and other Eurosceptics, the British Schengen protocol appears to constitute a
guarantee of the survival of the British nation.62 However, despite the weight
put on the British Schengen exemption, the UK has not opted out at all of the
principle of free movement. It is only British border control which has been
safeguarded through the treaty protocols. Hence, the UK is just as bound as
the other member states to respect the rights granted to EU citizens moving
across the border to live in the UK and receive the same social benefits and
rights as any British citizen. Articulating a particular form of identity border –
i.e., identity demonstrated by differential control of people, and symbolic
rehearsal of Britain’s status as an island – has protected the image of the
British nation. These various bordering practices help to refurbish a useful
fiction of national unity, and to fabricate a united identity despite apparent
political disagreements over the EU issue. But it has not prevented British
and Irish companies from benefiting from the cheap labour forces moving
in from Poland and other Eastern European countries, and provided British
and Irish citizens with the possibility of enjoying their pensions in Southern
Europe.
Another instance of picking and choosing can be found in the field of
legal jurisdiction. In the context of European integration, a question often
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posed concerns how far a state can delegate competencies to international
and supranational authorities and still remain a state. This question directs
our attention to a crucial element in state bordering practices: the drawing
of lines between competences – in itself a major concession to the realities
of disaggregation. Regulating the relationship between the competences of
national authorities and supranational authorities such as the EU, involves a
sort of constitutional picking and choosing. This is how one may understand
the recent decades’ toing-and-froing between national constitutional courts
and the European Court of Justice over how to interpret the relationship
between the EU treaties and national constitutions. Despite appearances, this
is not a zero-sum game, in which the supra-national wins what the national
loses, or vice versa.
We can see this in the case of the Czech republic, amongst others.
When Czech President Vaclav Klaus refused to sign the Lisbon Treaty (thus
prompting the court decision referred to above), he raised the question of
whether the Lisbon Treaty is compatible with the limits of Czech legitimate
political and legal authority. Apart from making it possible for the Czech
Republic to receive extra concessions (e.g., legal guarantees in relation to the
Charter on Fundamental Rights securing continued control over ownership
of the Czech territory), his opposition served the purpose of asserting for the
benefit of the domestic political audience the overall jurisdiction of the Czech
Republic within its legal border.63 President Klaus was re-cycling sovereignty
in its traditional form as independence: as an autonomous, fixed capital,
capable of annulling decisions that have led to its careless dissipation.64
The European integration process provides us with a range of examples
where states pick and choose to inscribe their borders on different planes.
This can be a more-or-less political exercise. What is more important is the
fact that the disaggregation of planes can lead states to become more political
in their bordering practices. Although sovereignty games do not fundamen-
tally change the idea of the sovereign state – in fact they may sometimes even
strengthen the appearances of it – they indicate a more fluid relationship, as
states move to articulate their separate identity in diverse ways, between any
state in question and the outside. Practices of bordering – or more partic-
ularly practices that imply how the border should be thought of – play a
central role when states engage in sovereignty games.
CONCLUSION
States do not choose whether to have a border or not. Yet they have a range
of possibilities when it comes to how they inscribe their borders in differ-
ent materials, or ‘planes’ (territorial, economic, legal, cultural, etc.). In this
article, we have argued that a central corollary of the current degree of
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‘disaggregation’ between planes of bordering is the selective approach to
state authority manifested in a will to ‘pick and choose the sovereign bor-
der’. Consequently, rather than asking to what degree the state is withering
away and whether absolute sovereignty is a thing of the past (as globalisa-
tion theory might do), a theory of state-bordering practices needs to look at
the interplay of the different functions of borders which states will seek to
fulfil by articulating the border as different planes of inscription.
We began by arguing that borders should properly be understood as a
sub-category of boundaries, which we determined to be pre-conditions for
numerous aspects of the existence and continuity of entities – including a
fortiori states. We explored the character of the border further by showing
how it will fulfil a range of functions – epistemological, ontological and/or
decisional – in the existence and continuity of any collective particular. For
states, we argued, these functions will be fulfilled by ‘inscribing’ borders
which inhibit or channel movement in terms of some kind of medium, sym-
bolic as well as material. That medium ranges from topology to culture and
knowledge. Thus, our theory is primarily interpretative. That is, it identifies
what we should be looking for in states’ articulations of their borders. While
it remains the case – as ever – that states may get to pick and choose the
topographical placing of the border, we have presented a case for focussing
attention rather on how states articulate border inscriptions to maintain their
identities as sovereign.
On different planes, different border inscriptions help constitute a par-
ticular topography of each state, a separate social identity for each state, an
economic room for manoeuvre, etc. These different inscriptions do not nec-
essarily correspond; indeed, they are semi-autonomous. Thus, what happens
to one border inscription on one plane (e.g., economic) does not straightfor-
wardly affect another plane (e.g., cultural). This disaggregation is of course
not new. But, we have argued, the ways states articulate their borders has
had to become more variegated.
Our final section discusses, primarily in the context of European inte-
gration, how those theoretical findings in various sovereign state bordering
practices serve not only to uphold sovereign states as a meaningful notion,
but also work in more subtle ways to integrate state sovereignty with interna-
tional organisations and other non-state actors. Seen from the point of view
of states, this selective approach to ‘the outside’ can be instrumentalised
in ‘sovereignty games’. In some cases, the various border claims constitute
symbolic bulwarks against absorption in the Other: rehearsing – despite the
dramatic changes taking place – an image of the state with full political and
legal authority over its people, territory, money, etc. By focusing on this
picking and choosing we understand how states may change as well as how
they continue to seem sovereign.
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